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Following the 2007 disputed Kenyan  Presidential election unprecedented levels of violence 
erupted across the country adding to the history of troubled elections in Africa. This paper offers 
quantitative and qualitative evidence on the incidence, impacts and issues that triggered electoral 
violence. Using two surveys conducted before and after the election we find that one out of three 
Kenyans were affected by the violence regardless of their ethnicity and wealth. The chances of 
being a victim of violence were higher in areas with land conflicts and where politically-
connected gangs operated. Violence, which was mainly triggered  by the perception that the 
election had been rigged, reduced trust and social capital among communities making violence 
more likely to reoccur.  
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Introduction 
Kenya was left with deep scars by the violence that erupted in the aftermath of the disputed 
Presidential election of 27 December 2007. In just a matter of weeks, Kenya was transformed 
from one of Africa’s most stable democracies into chaos. Political and ethnic violence left more 
than a thousand people dead and over 350,000 people were forced to flee their homes as violence 
and machete-wielding gangs roamed the streets (Amnesty International USA, 2008; CIPEV, 
2008). A coalition government headed by the former president Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga –
the two candidates claiming that each had won the presidential election- was agreed three months 
after the disputed elections. With the coalition agreement the electoral violence ceased, but the 
underlying triggers, extent and consequences of electoral violence in Kenya have still to be fully 
addressed.  
Since the 1990s many African autocracies have engaged in various efforts towards 
democratization, Kenya not being the exception. Support for democratization has primarily being 
used as an instrument to achieve accountability, install broadly legitimate governments and help 
in mediating disputes among the diverse ethnic groups. These institutional efforts are expected to 
improve economic performance and reduce proneness to political violence (Fearon and Laitin, 
2003; Carothers, 2007; Soudriette and Pilon, 2007).  However, with a few exceptions the recent 
record of African elections has raised concerns that in ethnically divided societies, competitive 
electoral processes could in fact be destabilizing by widening existing divisions and deepening 
divisions between winners and losers (Bardhan, 1997; Syder, 2000; Wilkinson, 2004; Mansfield 
and Snyder, 2005, Eiffert, Miguel and Posner, 2007). Elections in poor African countries such as 
Kenya have tended to significantly increase proneness to civil war and various other 
manifestations of violence (Collier and Rohner, 2008).  There are several likely reasons for the 
frequent failure of African elections such as having weak Electoral Commissions, inadequate 
judiciary and other institutions that can sustain democracy, but perhaps the main underlying cause 
is that no democratic means have been found to mediate the struggles over access to land and the   3 
resources controlled by the state (Bratton, 2008; De Smedt, 2009; Peters, 2009). Given these high 
stakes, politicians resort to a variety of means including vote buying,  intimidation, electoral 
violence (Lindberg, 2003; Wilkinson, 2004; Schaffer, 2007; Vicente, 2007; Bratton, 2008) and 
other methods of manipulation such as the old trick of stuffing ballot boxes, tampering with vote 
tallies and ballot stealing (Throup and Hornsby, 1998).  
The purpose of this article is to assess the incidence, impacts and the dynamics of the 
2007 electoral violence. The article seeks to provide light to understanding of who was affected 
by violence, what sort of issues triggered the violence and what were the consequences left by the 
electoral violence at community level. The majority of studies of conflict have tended to focus on 
cross-country comparisons, or in the case of country studies, to gather scant evidence, often 
anecdotal, which limits the understanding of what are the risk factors for violence. This paper 
aims to contribute to the emerging field of micro-quantitative studies on conflict (Collier and 
Vicente, 2008; Kalvas, 2008; Barron et al., 2009; Bellows and Miguel, 2009) by assessing the 
individual and local factors that increased the risk of being a victim of electoral violence. The 
quantitative and qualitative data used allow us to draw a national representative perspective, with 
enough data at small area-level, to be able to assess how violence emerged and affected people at 
community level.  Although the paper focuses on the experience of Kenya, its findings have 
broader relevance as they reveal what sort of institutional failures led to violence and reflect 
policies that could be taken to reduce the recurrence of civil conflict.   
To explore our research questions two surveys were undertaken, one just two weeks 
before the December 2007 general elections and a second one reinterviewing previous 
respondents in August of 2008. The pre-election survey asked about voter intentions, vote-
buying, intimidation and violence activities among other themes. The data are based on a 
nationally representative survey. The post-election survey revisited previous respondents to find 
out about their experiences in the aftermath of the election, their expectations from the new 
coalition government and  whether their views had changed regarding trust among Kenyans,   4 
democracy, rule of law, among other issues. As the surveys were conducted right before the 
elections and some time after the elections they provide a unique opportunity to explore how 
political perceptions changed in the aftermath of the elections and how our respondents were 
affected by violence and other non-democratic practices. Information was also collected on the 
poverty at constituency level ahead of the elections and earlier.  
As we follow our previous respondents of December 2007 over time rather than drawing 
a complete new sample of respondents we are able to analyze how electoral violence affected 
them. To complement the information on when and where electoral violence originated and how 
rapidly this evolved over time we also monitored the major media outlets across the country 
(local ratio stations, national newspapers and TV channels) on a daily and 24 hours basis from    
1 December 2007 until 31 March 2008. Collating the panel-survey data and the instances of 
electoral violence reported in media helps us build a more comprehensive picture of how violence 
emerged, where and when it spread and what consequences violence and other electioneering 
practices had on Kenyans.  
According to the self-reported incidence of violence in our surveys, violence affected one 
out of three Kenyans in terms of personal injury, being displaced from home, destruction of 
property, loss of jobs or earnings or having a friend or relatives that died in the elections. The 
likelihood of being a victim of violence was not affected by the respondent’s ethnicity or wealth 
but by where respondents  lived. Respondents living in urban areas and in areas which had 
suffered land disputes before the election had a higher likelihood of being victims of violence. 
Violence was directly instigated by political actors and by politically connected gangs such as 
Mungiki even before the elections. According to unsubstantiated reports in the media the police 
and politically connected gangs contributed to the majority of the killings observed during the 
post electoral violence (Ohito and Obonyo, 2010). Nonetheless, the majority of respondents 
believe that violence was triggered mainly by the perception that the election had been rigged.    5 
The ordeal of the disputed election reduced trust across ethnic groups, a key element of 
social capital among communities. International experience has shown that in situations where 
(ethnic) groups distrust each other and are afraid of being victimized, this fear might drive them 
to resort to violence first in a preemptive move to minimize damage (Bardhan, 1997).  Taking 
into account that having experienced conflict in the recent past is a good predictor for future 
conflict (Collier et al. 2008), Kenya is at risk of experiencing violence in the forthcoming 2012 
general elections if institutions are not strengthened to cope with the underlying grievances, the 
need for justice and the mistrust among ethnic groups. 
Although  much of the electoral violence ended with the formation of  the coalition 
government in Kenya, as it did in the recent case of Zimbabwe, coalition governments formed 
after disputed elections can set a misleading precedent to the future of democracy in Africa. 
Coalition governments are not a substitute for democracy and as our survey in Kenya showed, it 
is ultimately not what people want (at least not at the time we conducted the survey, six months 
after the formation of the coalition government).  
The article proceeds as follows:  In the next section, we provide a brief summary of the 
Kenyan history towards democracy and the 2007 political campaign. Section three presents some 
highlights of the survey and media data, focusing on when and where violence occurred, how 
people were affected, who were the victims and what are the perceived triggers of violence. 
Section four expands on this analysis by exploring in more detail the profile of victims of 
violence and how violence changed some of Kenyans’ perceptions, based on multivariate 
analysis.  The conclusions and discussion of the results are presented in section five.  
 
2. Kenyan Elections  
Kenya gained independence from Great Britain in 1963 and from then up until 2002 was ruled 
out by the political party Kenya African National Union (KANU).  KANU’s  dominance  was 
achieved by banning opposition parties in 1969 leaving Kenya a de facto one-party state to a de   6 
jure one-party state when a constitutional amendment in 1978 ruled that no other party was able 
to contest in the elections. In 1991 after much  pressure from Kenyan activists  and the 
international community multi-party elections were re-introduced. Several opposition parties 
emerged (FORD Kenya, FORD Asili, Democratic Party, Social Democratic Party, National 
Development Party of Kenya and other smaller parties). Nonetheless KANU remained in power 
winning the general  elections of 1992 and 1997 amid violence  and  allegations of electoral 
irregularities. Much of the violence occurred during the pre-elections period and was concentrated 
in the Rift  Valley  and Western provinces  and according to Kagwanja (2003) apparent local 
“Kalenjin warriors” attacked the homes and farms of migrant non-Kalenjin groups.  The 
government described the violence as ethnically motivated clashes that erupted spontaneously as 
a result of multi-party politics. Analysts though, argued that politicians instigated the violence as 
a tool for winning the elections.  People’s need for land was exploited by some politicians to 
instigate violence, especially in the Rift Valley, as it has happened in other African troubled 
elections (Peters, 2009). Kagwanja (2001) argues that the Kalenjin and Maasai ethnic groups 
were allowed to occupy land abandoned by displaced groups to ensure the political alliance of 
these groups and to prevent them from joining opposition parties.  The Kenyan elite aiming to 
suppress opposition political parties also recruited and sponsored ‘tribal militias’ and gangs for 
them to terrorize and instigate ethnic violence in the same vein as other African countries have 
done such as Cameroon, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan (Kagwanja, 2003).  Hence, 
contrary to the government’s description of the violence as ‘spontaneous ethnic clashes’, the 
evidence suggests that much of the violence was in fact sponsored by the State whose actions did 
little to contain it (Human Rights Watch, 1993, p.1).                  
The Kenyan Human Rights Commission (2001) estimates that state-sponsored or state-
condoned violence killed 4,000 people and displaced 600,000 others over the period 1991-2001. 
Much of this violence was sponsored in the Rift Valley and in urban areas, especially in Nairobi 
where the opposition held sway since 1992 (Kagwanja, 2003). The end result of this violence was   7 
the retribalization of politics and the erosion of civic nationhood (Kagwanja, 1998, 2003; Throup 
and Hornsby, 1998). 
In the general elections of 2002, all the opposition parties for the fist time united under 
the  National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) and behind a single presidential candidate, Mwai 
Kibaki. Kibaki won the presidential elections by defeating KANU’s presidential candidate Uhuru 
Kenyatta. Mwai Kibaki's Presidential election success in 2002 -declared free, fair and the most 
peaceful elections that Kenya has had in recent years by international observers- was hailed at the 
time as a step forward for Kenyan democracy. The democratic achievement was much owed for 
having formed a multi-tribal NARC coalition, unlike the previous multi-party elections where 
political parties formed seeking to target a specific ethnic group (Oyugi, 1997). It also helped that 
the two presidential candidates (of the NARC and KANU parties) were from the same ethnic 
group (Kikuyu). In that the election focused on which party would bring the most prosperity to 
the country forgetting tribalistic agendas.  
Kibaki came to power promising to turn the economy around, to introduce free primary 
education, to deliver a new constitution within 100 days of his presidency and to end corruption 
and tribalism. President Kibaki’s administration delivered to Kenya a booming tourism industry, 
economic growth increased  from a rate of close to zero to more than 6% annually and free 
primary school education was introduced. Less progress was achieved in tackling corruption, 
widespread poverty, simmering ethnic/land tensions and in delivering a reformed constitution.  
Kibaki’s defeat in the 2005 Referendum on a revised constitution failed to reach a 
consensus on how Kenya should be run. Among the policy issues in the referendum were the 
settling of land rights, the sharing of political power among ethnic groups -possibly between a 
President and Prime Minister- and how to decentralize resources across regions.  
The failed Referendum also split Kibaki’s cabinet. Roads Minister Raila Odinga and 
Environment Minister Kalonzo Musyoka, who led the group against the approval of the 
referendum, formed a new opposition political party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).   8 
In September 2007 the seventy-five year old President Kibaki declared that he would stand again 
in the presidential elections, backed by a new political alliance - the Party of National Unity 
(PNU).  Among Kibaki’s supporters, once his political rivals, were former president Daniel arap 
Moi and Uhuru Kenyatta, leader of the former ruling party KANU. KANU having failed to gain 
sufficient backing to mount a presidential bid left Kenya for the first time with a presidential 
election without KANU contesting it. The media blamed tribal loyalty as the main factor for this 
alliance. Odinga blamed President Kibaki of blackmailing former president Moi over possible 
charges of corruption against him. Regardless of the reason for the Kibaki-KANU alliance, the 
ODM was left with major chances of contesting the elections. But, just four months ahead of the 
elections the ODM split into two fractions as they failed to select a presidential candidate. So 
Kibaki faced a weakened opposition led by Raila Odinga, backed by ODM and Kalonzo 
Musyoka, backed by the new fraction ODM-Kenya.   
Monitoring 2007 Political Campaign  
To assess the nature of electoral campaigning and violence we requested the Steadman Group, a 
private company with the most experience in monitoring media in Kenya, to track political 
advertising, political campaigning as well as incidents of electoral violence across the country. 
Twelve major media outlets were monitored on a daily and 24 hours basis from 1 December 
2007 until 31 March 2008. Local radio stations and leading national newspapers and TV channels 
were monitored enabling us to have a broad picture of how political campaigning evolved at both 
local and national level. The radio stations monitored were the KBC radio service, Citizen Radio, 
Inooro FM, Kass FM, Ramogi FM, Mulembe. The TV stations monitored were KBC TV, CTV, 
NTV, KTN and the newspapers monitored were the Daily Nation and the Standard. 
The political campaigning centered around the politicians’ track record, trust, promised 
policies  but also on  tribalism. In contrast to the 2002 election, the 2007 elections were 
characterized by political parties pursuing sectarian agendas and accusing each other of using 
ethnicity for political purposes. For instance, Odinga’s political manifest argued “Ethnicity is a   9 
national disease knowing no regional boundaries and not confined to any one community. It rules 
our national politics and divides us unnecessarily. The Kibaki Government has compounded the 
ethnicity factor and deepened ethnicity in our public service by appointing people from his own 
community. Thus the reorganization of the Government was dictated by prejudice and not 
equity…The Kibaki government’s kazi iendelee means let the status quo prevail – public jobs for 
the few and not the many.” (ODM 2007, p. 16).  
Pre-Electoral Violence Reported in the Media  
To assess how peaceful the political campaigning was we reviewed all incidents of electoral 
violence reported in the twelve media outlets monitored (local ratio stations, newspapers and TV 
stations) from 1
 December 2007 until 31 March 2008. By electoral violence we refer to all acts of 
violence that were politically related as recorded in the media. The number of reports investigated 
were cross checked (by date, location and content) across the media houses monitored to avoid 
repetition or duplication of incidents.
1
There were a few incidents of electoral violence before the Election Day.  The great 
majority of them occurred during political rallies and were concentrated in specific small towns.  
This pre-electoral violence was manifested in the disruption of campaign rallies, threats of 
  Although this media monitoring analysis cannot 
conclusively ascertain that the events reported were indeed accurate or free of editorial 
interference, the overall death toll resulting from electoral violence according to our analysis of 
media reports (1,169) approximates the number in the reports of Amnesty International and the 
official number (1,174) of people killed by electoral violence (41 deaths in pre-electoral violence 
according to police reports plus 1,133 of deaths in post-electoral violence according to the Waki 
Report by CIPEV (2008)).  
                                                 
1 While CTV, Ramogi FM, Mulembe and Citizen Radio are affiliated to the same media house (Royal 
Media), and KBC radio and KBC TV belong to the state broadcaster, reports were cross checked to avoid 
repetition of incidents while logging the reports. 
   10 
violence to aspirants and party supporters, distribution of hate campaigns via leaflets and SMS 
that sought to incite violent prejudice against members of rival parties and direct violence on 
candidates and supporters including reported killings. Campaign-related ethnic violence was also 
reported in the Rift Valley as ethnic groups clashed within Molo, a district that reports cases of 
ethnic violence every election year as political rivalry and aggression is transferred to land 
ownership issues.  
Forty one people died as a result of pre-electoral violence in December. According to the 
media (and police reports) 25 of these deaths took place during campaign rallies, the highest 
death toll caused by campaign rallies in Kenya.  Since the great majority of deaths (25) occurred 
in the Molo district and not across the country the electoral campaign was perceived as free and 
fair by international observers and by the media. The scenario changed drastically in the period 
immediately after the 27 December 2007 general elections and the period following the 
announcement of the presidential results on 30 December. Before describing the events of post-
electoral violence we present next the voting intentions and electoral irregularities according to 
our survey respondents. 
 
3. Electoral Irregularities: Pre- and Post-Electoral Surveys  
Two weeks ahead of the elections we conducted a detailed survey of voter intentions, attitudes 
towards violence, socio-economic characteristics of Kenyans among other issues. The data are 
based on a nationally and regionally representative sample of 1,207 Kenyans aged 18 and over 
who were interviewed in 76 out of the 210 constituencies with a margin of sampling error of  +/-
3% at a 95% confidence level. The sample captures the rural/urban split consistent with the most 
recent Kenyan census that shows that 65% of respondents live in rural areas and the remainder in 
urban areas. The ethnic distribution of the sample respondents also matches that of the national 
population. We conducted a second survey in August 2008, revisiting previous respondents to 
find out about their experiences in the aftermath of the election, their expectations from the new   11 
coalition government and whether their views had changed regarding trust among Kenyans, 
democracy, land conflict, among other issues.  We managed to re-interview 60% of our previous 
respondents.
2
At the time of our pre-election survey, most respondents (98%) claimed that they would 
cast their vote in the following general elections. The two main presidential candidates, the then 
incumbent president Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga were in a close race with 39.1% of 
respondents intending to vote for Kibaki and 46.6% for Odinga. Classifying voter preferences for 
a presidential candidate and voters’ ethnic group shows that there is unison in the voting patterns 
 In order for our post-electoral survey to be comparable to our previous survey we 
replaced respondents that could not be found for new ones that had the same gender, education 
(defined as completed primary or less, or more than completed primary) and living in the same 
constituency as the respondent replaced. In addition if the respondent that could not be tracked 
back was a Meru, Kikuyu, Luo or Luhya the respondent was replaced with a person of the same 
ethnicity, gender, education who lived in the same constituency. We replaced respondents with 
new ones living in the same constituency, as our extensive pilot work in the worst areas affected 
by violence (Rift Valley, Nyanza and Nairobi) suggested that the great majority of displaced 
people moved within the same constituency to areas where they had relatives or to neighborhoods 
where there were more clusters of people from their ethnicity. Respondents of Meru, Kikuyu, Luo 
or Luhya that could not be tracked were replaced with respondents of the same tribe as our pilot 
work suggested that these were the ethnic groups worst affected by violence and above all by 
displacement. The main characteristics of both surveys respondents are listed in Table (1). 
                                                 
2 This apparently high attrition rate is to a considerable extent caused by problems with the tracking details 
in the first round of the survey. In December 2007, we never intended to revisit the sample, as the post-
election violence came as a surprise to us as to most observers. As a result, when conducting the new round 
of the survey in August 2008, we lacked often the necessary details for successful tracking. Displacement 
due to the violence cannot be ignored as a possible reason for not being able to re-interview a respondent, 
leading to the replacement rules as described in the text to minimize any bias arising from attrition.   12 
among most ethnic groups. The three main presidential candidates, Kibaki (of Kikuyu ethnicity), 
Odinga (of Luo ethnicity) and Kalonzo (of Kamba ethnicity) were overwhelmingly supported by 
the people from their own ethnic groups (as shown in Table 2).  Other ethnic groups that did not 
have a major presidential candidate contending in the election seem to have voted for one of the 
candidates in a block: The Luhyas and Kalenjins primarily supported Odinga, while the Merus 
and Embus supported Kibaki. Given the close proximity in the voter’s intentions any of these two 
candidates could have won depending on voter turnout.  
Who won the presidential elections? 
The elections were held on the 27 December 2007. Kenyans went to the polls in record numbers, 
some waited for hours in lines that were miles long (Gettleman, 2007). A day after the election, 
the first batch of results showed Raila Odinga with a clear advantage in the presidential race, 
leading by more than one million votes. The ODM declared victory for Raila Odinga on 29 
December but as more results were announced on the same day, the lead that Odinga had shrunk 
to only 38,000 votes with 90% of the votes counted. Against the predictions of opinion polls and 
the early counts of the votes, the Election Commission of Kenya found Mwai Kibaki the winner 
of the presidential election on 30 December, placing him ahead of Odinga by 232,000 votes. That 
is with 51.3% of the votes to Kibaki and 48.7% for Odinga and with a 69% of voter turnout. 
Following the disputed Electoral Commission's declaration, Kibaki was right away sworn in for 
his second term. Cries and doubts for a stolen election were immediately shared by the ODM 
party and international electoral observers.  
The ODM party pointed out that a sign of fraud was the fact that the MPs contending for 
the ODM (the party supporting Raila Odinga) had won 99 seats versus the 43 seats won by the 
MPs of the PNU (the party supporting Mwai Kibaki) in the general elections. Although one could 
argue that people voted strategically for Mwai Kibaki (the PNU party) for the presidency and for 
MPs backed by the ODM, our survey shows no sign of such strategic voting. The majority of 
those who claimed would vote for Raila Odinga for president also claimed that they would vote   13 
for MPs contending for the ODM (94%). Similarly those who claimed that they would vote for 
Mwai Kibaki supported MPs running for the PNU (92%).  
On 2 January 2009 Samuel Kivuitu, the Chairman of the Electoral Commission,  admitted  
"I do not know whether Kibaki won the election" (Ongiri, 2008). Kivuitu also revealed that he 
was put under pressure by “some PNU and ODM-Kenya leaders” by calling him frequently and 
asking to announce the results immediately.
3
With the information available in our surveys it is impossible to dwell on the 
irregularities mentioned by the opposition or electoral observers. But as shown in Table (2) both 
our pre- and post-electoral surveys suggest that Raila Odinga was the favorite to win among the 
electorate, more evidently so in the post-election survey.  
  Kivuitu  agreed to take the presidential election 
winner’s certificate to the State House after "some people threatened to collect it…". To Kivuitu’s 
surprise “the Chief Justice was already there ready to swear-in Kibaki". Kivuitu  agreed to 
announce the results because the Electoral Commission had no legal mandate to investigate 
complaints raised by the opposition immediately. It was a matter for the courts to investigate the 
irregularities.  
When and where electoral violence spread? 
Within hours of the announcement that Mwai Kibaki won the presidential election violence 
spread across much of the country. However, not all violence erupted ‘spontaneously’. Our pre-
electoral  survey shows  evidence of ethnic and politically instigated violence even before the 
elections. Roughly 30% of respondents claimed that ‘Political representatives openly advocated 
violence in their communities before the election’. This figure remained practically unchanged 
after the elections. Gangs connected with politics were frequently mentioned too. Before the 
elections 20% of respondents reported that they had heard frequently about gangs connected with 
politics in their community. This figure went up to 31% after the election. Similarly 20% reported 
                                                 
3 The ODM-K had apparently an agreement with the PNU which stated if Kibaki was to be re-elected 
president, Kalonzo would become the vice-president of Kenya.    14 
having heard frequently of ethnic violence in their community before the elections, and this figure 
went up to 35% after the elections.  
Also there were  plenty of irregularities before the elections such as vote-buying, having 
suffered intimidation from members of political parties and land disputes. Specifically, one out of 
two respondents experienced attempted vote buying and almost one out of six experienced 
intimidation. Five percent of respondents “Had land disputes over the year ahead of the election” 
and similarly 5.3% accepted to be “Settled in an irregular land scheme”.  Before the elections 
there was widespread fear that violence would erupt, roughly 50% of respondents were afraid that 
electoral violence would spread to their constituency before the elections, and this figure went up 
to 58% after the elections.  
According to the media reports, after the elections and especially once the results were 
announced, the opposition party supporters went on an unprecedented level of ‘orgy of violence’ 
which lead to counter attacks and ‘revenge killings’ (Otieno, 2009; The Standard, 2009). 
Violence spread to five out of the eight provinces in Kenya (Nairobi, Nyanza, Rift Valley, 
Western, Coast and Central). The bulk of the violence was reported in Nairobi and the Rift 
Valley, due to the proximity between feuding ethnic communities in these places. From the 1st to 
the 10th of January violence was predominantly in Nyanza, Western, North and South Rift and 
the Nairobi slums. In Nyanza and the Western provinces most of the deaths reported were from 
police related shootings: 56 people were reported shot by the police in the first week in Kisumu, 
with over 46 people killed in Eldoret in a single incident by raiders in the first week.  
January was dominated by demonstrations with the slogan ‘No Raila, no peace!’ as the 
ODM called several times for nationwide demonstrations aimed at forcing the elected president to 
resign (De Smedt, 2009). In the Rift Valley revenge attacks which began in Nakuru in late 
January rose in intensity and spread along the main highway to affect the towns of Naivasha and 
also Limuru and Kikuyu in the Central province. In Nairobi, the police tried to stop 
demonstrations with water cannon, teargas, arrests and barricades between slums and wealthier   15 
suburbs resulting in more clashes (De Smedt, 2009) and more alleged cases of people killed by 
police bullets.  
On 1 February, ex-UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan  announced that Kibaki and 
Odinga had agreed on an agenda for peace talks. On 28th February, after weeks of bloodshed, 
international pressure and tense negotiations the important handshake was finally reached. 
President Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader Raila Odinga put the disputed elections behind 
them and agreed to share power. Kibaki was to remain the elected President, Kalonzo the Vice-
President and Odinga was to be appointed Prime Minister –a post which did not exist then under 
the Kenyan constitution.  
With the peace agreement violence also swiftly ceased  (despite that, only 20% of 
respondents agreed that forming the coalition government was their “Preferred choice to end the 
disputed presidential elections”). The monitored media sources account for 1,127 people killed 
because of electoral violence from the Election Day 27 December 2007 until 29 February 2008. 
The official post-electoral death toll over the same period was 1,133 and 3,561 people injured 
according to the Waki Commission in charge of investigating the electoral violence (CIPEV, 
2008 p. 305 and p. 331).
4
Media reports, such a the one by Ohito and Obonyo (2010), state that an estimated 1,000 
deaths are linked to the Kenyan Police  alone  and hundreds are attributable to politically-
connected gangs such as Mungiki. These reports might well over-represent the extent to which the 
police is responsible for the casualties. For instance, the Waki report finds that 35.7% of the 
 In total, we found 1,169 people killed because of electoral violence 
from 1 December 2007 until the 23 March 2008. Among the dead were two recently elected MPs 
(from the ODM party).   
                                                 
4 The Commission estimated the death toll using medical and post-mortem reports, police returns, reports 
received from private hospitals and institutions and various witness statements, depositions and oral 
testimonies. The estimate of people injured refers to the people who attended hospitals and other 
established institutions but  who did not died.    16 
casualties can be directly linked to the police (405 out of the 1,133) as they died because of gun 
shots wounds (CIPEV, 2008p.331).  
Electoral violence in addition to claiming lives,  injuring  people and displacing over 
350,000 people also affected the economy.  The tea and flowers exports industries, in which 
Kenya is a main leader in the world market, were  severely hit because their workers were 
displaced far from the fields. Ksoll et al. (2009) estimate that flowers exports were reduced by 
38% during the first quarter of 2008 because of electoral violence directly. The FAO reported less 
than 10% of land had been prepared for planting season by January 2008. Normally, at least 80% 
would have been planted by that time (Kimani, 2008). The tourism industry, the second highest 
foreign exchange earner after horticulture, was also affected as the violence occurred during what 
is typically the Kenyan peak holiday season.  Foreign offices advised not to travel to Kenya 
unless absolutely essential, leading to a  steep fall in number of tourists  visiting the country. 
According to the Kenyan Tourist Board occupancy rates dropped to an average 30% compared to 
86% in the year before. As a result tourism revenues plummeted 54% from 2007 in the first 
quarter of 2008 (Holland, 2008). Professor Terry Ryan, adviser to Kenya's Central Bank, 
estimated that the rate of growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) more than halved from 
the 6%  before  the election to 2% because of the electoral violence  (Crilly, 2008).  Kenya 
Manufacturing Association Chairman,  Steven Smith,  estimated that the industry’s production 
reduced by 35% in January and a further 20% by April. He also estimated a 3% loss of growth in 
GDP, due to loss of jobs, business opportunities and the impact that the Kenyan crisis had in the 
region’s economy (Kimani, 2008).  
Abe Selassie from the International Monetary Fund representative in Uganda argued that 
the Kenyan political crisis had exposed the East African region’s “overreliance” on Kenya’s 
transport infrastructure, especially the Mombasa port (Kimani, 2008). The numerous blocked 
roads and vandalized rail lines in Kenya affected significantly the economy of the region. Fuel   17 
prices rose throughout East Africa. The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) estimates that fuel costs in Uganda, Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Burundi rose by up to 50% as a consequence of the Kenyan crises. Fuel costs more than double in 
Rwanda causing shortages and prompting the government to institute fuel rationing. Trade 
networks were also disrupted especially for the landlocked economies of Uganda, Rwanda and 
Burundi, South Sudan and the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo  which  rely on trade 
through the Kenyan port of Mombasa.
5
To what extent and how were people affected by violence? 
 According to Juma Mwapachu, the Secretary General of 
the East African Community "Trade flows have been negatively affected and so have exchequer 
and business revenues…We can only promote and attract investments sustainably, as well as 
assure effective intra-regional trade, if we have enduring peace and stability." (BBC News, 2008).  
Apart from the obvious impact that the Kenyan political crisis had on the macro-economic level, 
the crises had consequences at the micro-level. Here we explore the extent to which, Kenyans, 
were affected on the ground. To explore whether our survey respondents were affected by the 
outbreaks of electoral violence we asked “Were you personally affected in the outbreaks  of 
violence after 2007 in any of the following ways?” Twenty-nine percent of respondents reported a 
specific personal impact after the elections, that is in terms of personal injury, being displaced 
from home, destruction of property, loss of jobs or earnings or having a friend or relatives that 
died in the elections. Figure (1) shows that about 3% of respondents claimed that their houses 
were destroyed in the outbreaks of violence and 7% of respondents claimed that their houses were 
damaged.  
                                                 
5 More than 80% of Uganda’s imports pass through the port of Mombasa, as do almost all of Rwanda’s 
exports. According to the Uganda Manufacturers Association manufacturers had lost $43 USD million 
because of the delays, destruction of goods and slowed production caused by the Kenyan crisis (Kimani, 
2008).   18 
A further question asking directly whether the respondent had a family member that died 
because of the electoral violence revealed that 4.6% of respondents had suffered from this event. 
This figure needs to be interpreted carefully as our respondents might have understood the 
definition of “family member killed” in a loose term, such as having close friends or having heard 
of someone in their community being killed.  
One out of the 1,207 respondents interviewed in December 2007 unfortunately died and 
according to relatives the respondent died as a result of the electoral violence.  Roughly 2% of 
respondents claimed that they “Moved to a camp for displaced people in response to the incidents 
of electoral violence?” (Figure 2). Also a few others (1%) moved to neighboring countries such 
as Tanzania. 
As Figure (3) shows the provinces with the highest concentration of victims of electoral 
violence  according to our post-electoral survey are in the Rift Valley, followed by Eastern, 
Nyanza and Western. This distribution of incidence of violence coincides with the one mentioned 
in media reports.  
What issues triggered electoral violence? 
We asked respondents the open question “What triggered electoral violence in your 
neighborhood?” The majority of respondents  (42%) think election irregularities and a weak 
Electoral Commission were the main factors that triggered electoral violence. Of course this does 
not necessarily mean that this was the cause of violence, but just what ignited violence. Only 10% 
of respondents report to believe that electoral violence was triggered by tribal conflict and 
roughly a third of respondents do not know or did not want to state what the main trigger of 
electoral violence was.  
Consequences of violence 
The events that followed the general elections of 2007 might have affected political behavior and 
many of Kenyan’s views such as support for democracy. Perhaps surprisingly we found that in 
both surveys the majority of respondents (70%) reported democracy as the most preferable type   19 
of government. However, the perception that Kenya is a full democracy changed. In December 
2007, 20% of respondents believed that Kenya was a fully democratic country. That perception is 
now shared by only 6%. The majority of people (86%) still believe that Kenya is a democratic 
country, although with problems. 
To elaborate on Kenyan’s view on democracy respondents were asked about their trust in 
elections. There is a statistically significant increase from 10% to 26% of respondents preferring 
other methods for choosing leaders. In other words, Kenyans have faith in democracy, but not in 
elections. Of course, democracy is not just about holding elections. Institutions are needed to 
sustain democracy. Therefore it is important to look at how much institutions are trusted and how 
they are regarded. The surveys reveal that the Kenyan Electoral Commission has lost its 
credibility. In December 2007, 11% of respondents claimed “Not to trust at all the Electoral 
Commission”. That perception increased to 50% after the election. In general people lost trust in 
the ECK regardless of who they claimed they had voted for president in the elections of 2007 or 
whether respondents had been victims or not in the outbreaks of the electoral violence.  
President Kibaki has also lost trust since December 2007 as a result of the outbreaks of 
violence. In December 2007, 33% of respondents claimed to “Trust a lot president Mwai Kibaki”. 
This figure showed a statistically significant drop to 21% by August 2008. At first glance these 
results might indicate that there is a generalized loss of trust in institutions. However, those who 
“Trust the parliament a lot” increased from 8% to 17%, which might be partly due to the fact that 
the parliament had a high turnover rate, with 80% of incumbent MPs not succeeding in their re-
election bid.  
Perhaps the most dramatic change after the elections is the deterioration of trust and in 
general of social capital across ethnic groups and communities. By social capital we mean the 
shared trust and norms that arise from informal social networks which have a consequent effect 
on expectations and behavior (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004, p. 5).  Figure (4) shows that trust 
has significantly declined, especially across ethnic groups.  Pre-election the trust levels were not   20 
particularly high among groups (only 8% claiming they “Trust a lot people from other ethnic 
group” in December 2007). Post-election roughly 50% of respondents claimed that their “Trust 
towards people of other ethnic groups was worse than in December 2007”. Nineteen percent of 
respondents claimed that they “Lost trust towards their own ethnic group since the elections”.  
The post-electoral survey also reveals that the loss of trust across ethnic groups has had 
some deeper consequences in informal economic networks. Many socio-economic relationships 
are based on trust, and not simply on economic interests. Clear examples of this type of trust-
based relationships are economic exchanges, that is how much one does business with others.  
According to the post-electoral survey, 33% of respondents claimed that the extent to which they 
“Do business with people from other ethnic groups had worsened since the elections”.    
International experience has shown that when groups distrust each other and are afraid of 
being victimized, this fear might drive them to resort to violence first in a preemptive move to 
minimize damage (Bardhan, 1997).  This might explain for the animosity towards violence 
observed after the disputed elections. In December 2007, 12% of respondents answered that it is 
“Sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause”, this figure went up to 21% by 
August 2008. In other words today, one in four Kenyans say that violence is justified. The survey 
also shows that Kenyans are divided on whether amnesty should be given to those who were 
involved in the outbreaks of violence. Roughly 43% of respondents disagree with granting 
amnesty, whilst 45% agree  amnesty should be given. 
 
4.  Econometric Analysis: Profile of victims of violence 
In this section we assess which are the main individual and local variables which increased the 
chances of being a victim of post-electoral violence. We explore this profile of the victims of 
post-electoral violence using a multivariate analysis and the post-electoral survey. In the analysis 
we use the 1,207 interviews conducted in August 2008, that is the 667 reinterviews of the original 
respondents whom we tracked over time and the 540 interviews of the replaced respondents.    21 
Based on the quantitative and qualitative analyses of the electoral violence in the 2007 
elections (and of the ones of 1992, 1997 and 2002) we identified four main variables that might 
be particularly correlated to the likelihood of being a victim of electoral violence. The first relates 
to the importance of land disputes in getting caught in electoral violence. The first hypothesis to 
test is that people who had land disputes were more likely to be victims of post-electoral violence. 
This seems to have been the case in previous multi-party elections in Kenya and in other African 
countries (Bardhan, 1997; Kagwanja, 2003; Peters, 2009) and our quantitative evidence suggest 
that might have been the case in the 2007 elections as well. Without specifying the mechanisms, 
of whether people with land disputes instigated or were caught in violence, we expect that people 
whom had land disputes ahead of the election were more likely to having been victims of post-
electoral violence.  The second main hypothesis is that people living in areas where gangs 
politically  connected operated were more likely to be victims of post-electoral violence. The 
rationale is that these gangs were ready to instigate violence and attack people increasing the 
chances of being a victim in areas where these gangs operated. Since the 1990s these gangs have 
operated in urban areas, particularly in slums in Nairobi (Anderson, 2002; Kagwanja, 2003; De 
Smedt, 2009), so we would expect people living in these areas to be more likely victims of 
violence.  The  third hypothesis suggests  that poverty, as  a proxy of relative deprivation and 
grievance, motivated people to be violent. There is international evidence that grievances in terms 
of resource deprivation, and poverty, can lead to rebellion, protest and civil conflict, especially in 
Africa (Addison, 1998; Collier, 2000; Collier and Rohner, 2008). If this is the case in Kenya, then 
we would expect that the people most affected by violence were either the poor or those living in 
poorer areas. The fourth main hypothesis we explore is whether the chance of being a victim of 
violence is correlated to being member of a specific ethnic group. If it is true that one group tried 
to cleanse another, we would expect different likelihoods of being victims of violence by ethnic 
groups.  It is of interest to assess whether people living in communities which are more ethnically 
mixed had a higher risk of being victims  of violence.  Although there is mixed  international   22 
evidence on this (Fearon and Laitin, 2003), some studies have found that typically ethnically 
mixed societies are more likely to engage into conflict (Gurr, 2000). The history of elections in 
Kenya has shown that politicians have tapped into people’s ethnic differences with the purpose of 
dividing the electorate and conquering political rents. So it is of interest to assess whether ‘this 
divide and conquer policy’ increases the chances of being victim of violence in relatively low or 
high ethnically mixed communities.     
To assess the profile of victims of violence we use the probit model shown in equation 
(1) using as dependent variable the respondent’s answer to “Were you personally affected in the 
outbreaks of violence after 2007 in any of the following ways?: Personal injury, destruction of 
home, being forced to leave home, damage to personal property, loss of a job, destruction/closure 
of business, loss of earning from business, friends or relatives died.” In the probit model we 
control for the respondent’s characteristics, represented by vector Xi, the province where the 
respondent lived right before the elections Pi, and the degree of ethnic diversity in the area where 
the respondent lived right before the elections ETHNICi.  
                 Pr (victim of electoral violenceic=1)=Φ(α+Xiβ+Piη+ETHNICiδ),             eq. (1) 
where Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution and 
α is a constant. Since there are no publically available measures of ethnic diversity at district level 
in Kenya, we measure ethnic diversity using our pre-electoral survey, and the Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization (ELF) index in eq. (2), used in much of the analysis of ethnic diversity and 
conflict (Alesina et al. 2003).   






















is the proportion of people belonging to ethnic group j in district j. This index of ethnic 
diversity takes the value of zero if all the population in the district belongs to the same ethnic 
group and increases in value the more ethnically diverse the population is in the district. In our   23 
sample, the majority of districts sampled had respondents belonging to more than one ethnic 
group (74 out of 77) so the ELF index ranges from zero to 0.8.  
   Table (3), under column (1), presents the regression coefficients of the individual and 
local  factors that influenced the probability of being a victim of electoral violence. The 
coefficients reported are marginal effects  and the robust standard errors are clustered at 
constituency level. The respondents who were more likely to have been victims of electoral were 
those who reported “Had land disputes in the year previous to the 2007 elections” (increasing the 
probability of experiencing violence by 18%), living in urban areas (increasing it by 7%) and 
respondents who claimed “There where organized gangs connected to politics operating in their 
communities before the elections” (which increases the probability of violence by 13%). This 
evidence is in favor of our first and second hypotheses that electoral violence was infused by 
political actors and by land disputes.  
Respondent’s wealth level was not a contributing factor for being affected by violence. 
We assessed a respondent’s wealth level by constructing a wealth-asset index based on the 
responses to “from the following list which of these things does your household own?”. The list 
of things includes 15 possible durable assets
6
                                                 
6 Question includes: book, radio, television, bicycle, motor vehicle, house, oven, fridge, washing machine, 
land telephone, land, cattle, and in the question referring to respondent’s wealth computer and mobile 
phones were added. The answers were recorded as either no, yes, or don’t know.  
, which we used to construct a normalized wealth-
asset index ranging from 0 (respondent not owing assets at all) to 1 (owning all 15 listed assets). 
Table (3) shows that the probability of being a victim of electoral violence was not statistically 
significantly affected by wealth. We also used the poverty level where the respondent lived (at 
constituency level) reported by the Kenyan Bureau of Statistics in 2006. The marginal effect of 
poverty 0.001 (standard error of .091 and not shown in the table) was not statistically significant. 
In fact, the marginal effect was close to zero and not statistically in all models shown in Table (3) 
therefore not presented.  This evidence fails to support our third hypothesis that poverty in Kenya   24 
was one of the factors that contributed to the electoral violence.  
In terms of ethnicity, we find that those of Meru and Kamba origin were less likely to be 
victims of violence than those of Kikuyu origin (the base group), but no statistical difference in 
whether a Luo or Kikuyu, the two main opposing ethnicities, were affected. Respondents living in 
the Central and Eastern  provinces were less likely to be victims of violence than those living in 
Nairobi before the 2007 elections.  We find no significant evidence to suggest that the degree of 
ethnic fragmentation in the area where respondents lived affected the likelihood of being a victim 
of electoral violence.  
We move on to explore the factors that influenced the probability of specifically being 
physically attacked or injured.  To assess this issue we run a second probit model using as a 
dependent variable whether the respondent “Had been physically attacked or injured because of 
electoral violence.” The results shown in Table (3) under column (2). The sample analyzed is 
reduced from 1,207 to 982 as there is strong correlation between the likelihood of being victim of 
physically attacked or injured among the Kamba, Mijikenda and Somalies, hence these 
observations are dropped from the analysis. Once these observations are dropped the profile of 
those who were physically attacked or injured suggest that the respondent’s ethnicity and wealth 
level did not affect the chances of being injured or attacked. However the chances of being 
injured or attacked increased by 9% if respondents reported “Having heard of gangs connected to 
politics operating in their communities before the elections”. We find no significant evidence to 
suggest that the degree of ethnic fragmentation in the area where respondents lived affected the 
likelihood of being physically attacked.  
In a third probit model we explore the factors that influenced the probability of suffering 
a loss in income or assets “because of failed household business (non-agricultural) as a 
consequence of electoral violence”. The results shown in Table (3) under column (3) show that 
respondents’ chances of having their business fail increased by 10% if the respondent had “Heard 
of organized gangs connected to politics operating in their communities before the elections”.   25 
The chances of suffering a loss of income or assets increased by 5% if they were living in an 
urban setting probably as violence clustered in urban areas where businesses (non-agricultural) 
concentrate. The Luos, Luhyas, Kambas and Kissis were less likely to have reported a loss of 
income or assets because of failed business than the Kikuyus.  
 
Should amnesty be granted? 
Our descriptive analysis suggests that a great proportion of the population (one out of three) were 
affected by the electoral violence in many ways: personal injury, death of relatives or friends, loss 
of income or assets, being displaced from home. A current heated debate in Kenya has focused on 
whether amnesty should be granted to those who committed or instigated electoral violence. To 
assess the views of our respondents on this matter we asked them “In your view should people 
who participated in the incidents of violence in the 2007 elections be forgiven, that is given 
amnesty?”. Using the responses to this question we estimate the probit model shown in eq. (3). As 
the explanatory variable we use respondent’s characteristics, represented by vector Xi: wealth 
level, ethnicity, whether was living in an urban area and whether the respondent was victim of 
violence in a broad sense (having suffered from personal injury, destruction of home, being 
forced to leave home, damage to personal property, loss of a job, destruction/closure of business, 
loss of earning from business, friends or relatives died). We also control for the province where 
the respondent lived right before the elections Pi, and the degree of ethnic diversity in the area 
where the respondent lived right before the elections ETHNICi. We do not control for whether 
respondent had land disputes or heard of gangs operating in area as these variables are correlated 
with the probability of being victim of violence.  
In Table (3) under column (4) it is shown that the probability of thinking that amnesty 
should be given is not affected by whether the respondent was a victim in the outbreak of 
electoral violence. This may appear counter-intuitive, but it is possible that many of the victims of 
violence resorted to violence themselves (not necessarily to defend themselves), and are therefore   26 
afraid of being prosecuted if amnesty is not granted. Respondents of Luo, Luhya, Kissi, Kalenjin 
and other minor ethnic group are more likely to think amnesty should be given than those of 
Kikuyu origin. The difference in opinions about amnesty across ethnic groups might obey that 
ODM supporters suffered more arrests than the Kikuyus during the demonstrations and months of 
post-electoral violence (De Smedt, J. (2009).  
                            Pr (amnesty should be giveni=1) =Φ(α+Xiβ+Piη+ETHNICiδ)     eq.  (3) 
 
Impact on Social Capital 
Here we focus more closely on assessing some of the consequences of the disputed election on  
how people relate to each other. For this purpose we run a probit regression using as a dependent 
variable  whether the survey respondent answered that “Since the elections of 2007 the 
respondent’s trust has worsened for people of other ethnic groups”. We control for  respondent’s 
characteristics (wealth level, ethnicity, whether was victim of violence and living in an urban 
area), represented by vector Xi, the province where the respondent lived right before the elections 
Pi, and the degree of ethnic diversity in the area where the respondent lived right before the 
elections ETHNICi.  
                                        Pr (trust got worsei=1)=Φ(α+Xiβ+Piη+ETHNICiδ)                         eq.  (4) 
As shown in Table (3) under column (5) shows that trust for people of other ethnic group 
was not affected by respondent’s wealth level or whether respondent was living in an urban 
setting. However, having being victim of post-electoral violence increased the probability of not 
trusting  people of other  ethnic groups by 7%.  Luhya,  Kamba,  Meru, Kissi,  Kalenjin and 
Mijikenda are less likely to report that their trust for people of other ethnic group got worse 
compared to the Kikuyu (the reference group).  
In column (6) we instead focus on the factors the probability that respondents answered 
“Since the elections of 2007 the respondent’s trust has worsened for people of his/her ethnic   27 
group”. We find no evidence that having being victim of violence affected the probability of 
distrusting people of same ethnic group.  
To conclude or econometric analysis we estimate a probit model using as a dependent 
variable whether respondents answered “The extent to which they do business with people from a 
different tribe to his/hers has deteriorated since the elections”. The results of this model, 
presented in (7), show that the probability of a respondent doing less business with people of 
other tribes was not affected by respondent’s ethnicity (with the exception of the Somalies), by 
whether respondent was affected by violence or living in urban setting.  
 
5.  Conclusions  
The objective of this article was to investigate of the triggers of the Kenyan electoral violence, its 
characteristics and consequences. We showed that before the elections there were widespread 
irregular electoral practices, including instigation of violence. One out of two experienced 
attempted vote buying, one out of three heard of organized gangs connected to politics instigating 
violence in their communities and almost one out of six experienced intimidations. The belief that 
the elections had been stolen was the straw that broke the camel’s back triggering the 
unprecedented levels of violence. However the violence, which affected one out of three Kenyans 
and the economy in the East Africa region, was rather the explosive result of a combination of 
historical, economic and political factors. Old grievances such as land disputes became entangled 
in the outbreaks of electoral violence. We found evidence of politically instigated violence in the 
form of organized gangs both before and after the elections. As such the chances of being a 
victim of violence were higher in areas with land conflicts and where politically-connected gangs 
operated. Institutional failures at the macro-level (weaknesses of the Electoral Commission, the 
administration of the police, the judiciary system, political parties, among others) were also at the 
root of the problem contributing to the conflict and the deterioration of trust in institutions and 
social capital at community level.     28 
International experience has shown that ethnic conflicts are often the result of the decline 
of meditating institutions such as political parties as a forum of democratic negotiations and the 
lack of pre-existing credible commitments across groups (Bardhan, 1997). Political-institutional 
failures have been especially common in Africa (with extreme examples such as Burundi, Liberia, 
Rwanda, Somalia and Zimbabwe) as ethnically-based parties in electoral systems  where the 
winner takes it all, tend to obey to ‘extreme ethnic demands’ (Bardhan, 1997, p.1390). It is then 
that ethnic demands lessen the potential stabilizing factor of inclusion that democracy aims to 
achieve.  
The  nature of much of the electoral-violence potentially calls into question how 
democracy in Kenya and in general of African countries alike can work when deeply divided by 
ethnic allegiances. If allegiance is based on ethnic identity the normal beneficial consequences of 
elections may not hold: elections may fail to discipline governments into improved economic 
performance. Conversely, they may leave a dysfunctional legacy of violence and uncertainty 
(Collier et al. 2010). 
International evidence provided by Chauvet and Collier (2009) suggests that elections in 
developing countries only improve policies if they are well-conducted. Hence, from the 
perspective of Kenya, the contested results and the aftermath of the 2007 election may constitute 
a setback to what had until then appeared to be a beneficial process of democratization.   
So what can Kenya do to continue growing and remain a peaceful democratic country? 
Some requirements are evident. As the recent experiences of other African countries have shown, 
it makes little sense to run elections in an environment where violence is openly instigated by 
politicians. It is crucial then to have an independent electoral commission that is equipped with all 
the judiciary and other capabilities to guarantee free and fair elections. Reforming the current 
centralised fiscal system such that it provides inclusion and resources to all, regardless of which 
party is in power, could also help to reduce much of the disputes and rent-seeking behaviour that   29 
is currently contributing to conflict. Solving existing land disputes and irregularities, and avoiding 
them particularly during the elections can also reduce the risk of violence. 
It is equally important to restore the rule of law and to prosecute electoral malpractices 
such as the instigation of violence by political parties or organized gangs, intimidation, vote 
buying and ultimately the stuffing of ballot boxes. No single person has yet been tried for the 
electoral violence or the electoral irregularities. Amnesty and oblivion is a way of legitimizing 
violence. Amnesty is unlikely to help in the reconciliation of Kenyans and in the prevention of the  
atrocities that Kenya witnessed from reoccurring. It is a matter that Kenya needs to take seriously. 
Kenya will have to act now or face the consequences, especially so considering that an 
international predictor of civil conflict is having had a conflict in the past. Because of Kenya’s 
crucial economic role in the East African region, the efforts of preventing a new crisis is no 
longer reduced to preventing the socio-economic devastation solely of Kenya but beyond her 
borders.    
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Appendix 
Table (1): Characteristics of Pre- and Post- Election Survey Respondents 









Aged 18-26 37.67 38.26 42.0
Wealth asset index 0 - 40% 16.03 16.03 16.6
Victim of post-electoral violence 29.29 28.90 29.4
Male 52.48 52.24 54.0
Ethnicity
Kikuyu 18.47 17.93 16.9
Luo 12.29 12.32 13.2
Luhya 15.70 14.51 20.5
Kamba 9.36 9.70 9.3
Meru 8.14 8.31 6.3
Kissi 7.97 8.05 8.1
Kalenjin 8.87 9.08 9.6
Mijikenda 6.18 6.87 5.3
Somali 3.17 3.25 2.1
Others 9.85 9.98 8.7
Rural 60.93 61.40 62.2
Province
Nairobi 7.03 7.83 5.9
Central 9.17 8.70 7.8
Coast 12.34 13.15 10.2
Eastern 16.54 16.46 14.2
Nyanza 15.25 14.49 15.4
Rift Valley 24.68 24.51 25.8
Western 12.08 11.58 18.4
North Eastern 2.91 3.27 2.3
Education
No schooling-complete high school 75.10 69.99 74.4
More than high school 24.90 28.72 25.6
Observations 1207 1207 667  
   Source: Author  pre- and pos- electoral surveys.   34 
 














Muzyoka did not vote
Kikuyu 5.7 88.1 0.4 2.2 8.4 86.5 0.8 0.8
Luo 93.4 4.0 0.0 0.7 94.2 2.7 0.0 2.4
Luhya 65.3 20.7 1.6 5.7 78.2 13.1 0.7 3.7
Kamba 0.9 19.1 73.9 0.9 8.3 28.2 59.0 3.7
Meru 6.0 89.0 2.0 0.0 6.0 90.0 0.0 1.1
Kissi 64.3 27.6 1.0 1.0 66.4 20.9 1.1 5.1
Kalenjin 79.8 14.7 1.8 0.9 88.0 12.0 0.0 0.0
Mijikenda 60.5 25.0 3.9 2.6 75.1 16.8 1.5 1.4
Somali 35.9 56.4 2.6 0.0 68.8 13.7 6.7 4.3
Others 57.0 32.2 1.7 1.7 65.9 28.9 0.8 2.8
National Average 46.1 39.1 8.1 2.0 52.9 35.4 6.5 2.3
Post-Election Survey Pre-Election Survey
 
Source: Author pre- and pos- electoral surveys. 
 









0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14%
Loss of earnings from business
Destruction/closure of business
Loss of a job
Damage to personal property





             Source: Author pre- and pos- electoral surveys. 
 






0% 1% 2% 3% 4%
moved in with relatives or others in the
same area
moved to a camp for displaced people
relocated to another rural area in Kenya




             Source: Author pre- and pos- electoral surveys.   35 
 


















                  Source: Author pre- and pos- electoral surveys. 
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How much you do business with people
from other ethnic groups
How much you trust people of other
ethnic groups






    Source: Author pre- and pos- electoral surveys.  36 
Table (3): Profile of victims of violence and consequence of violence 












trust got worse 
for people of 
other ethnicity
 Respondent's 
trust got worse 




with people from 
different 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Respondent had land disputes before election  0.181* 0.030 0.120
(0.106) (0.083) (0.098)
Respondent heard of gangs connected to politics 
acting in community 0.125** 0.088*** 0.096***
(0.044) (0.022) (0.029)
Respondent's assets index -0.009 -0.050 -0.095 -0.011 0.086 0.058 0.002
(0.095) (0.067) (0.078) (0.116) (0.095) (0.079) (0.097)
Ethnicity (Kikuyu base group)
                                           Luo 0.076 0.024 -0.070** 0.300*** -0.051 -0.033 0.009
(0.067) (0.047) (0.033) (0.076) (0.059) (0.051) (0.066)
                                           Luhya 0.044 -0.006 -0.067* 0.256*** -0.105** -0.027 0.039
(0.068) (0.039) (0.039) (0.059) (0.053) (0.045) (0.055)
                                           Kamba -0.131** -0.135*** 0.037 -0.128** -0.085 -0.078
(0.052) (0.026) (0.085) (0.059) (0.052) (0.069)
                                           Meru -0.204*** 0.093 0.023 0.111 -0.114* 0.083 -0.024
(0.040) (0.109) (0.088) (0.085) (0.062) (0.082) (0.085)
                                          Kissi 0.011 0.012 -0.080** 0.177** -0.100* 0.019 0.027
(0.061) (0.055) (0.035) (0.085) (0.060) (0.064) (0.069)
                                          Kalenjin -0.033 0.020 -0.035 0.216** -0.110** -0.055 0.038
(0.052) (0.044) (0.041) (0.081) (0.046) (0.039) (0.056)
                                         Mijikenda -0.061 -0.020 0.127 -0.165** -0.077** -0.060
(0.058) (0.044) (0.101) (0.067) (0.038) (0.070)
                                         Somali -0.018 -0.028 -0.029 0.169 0.177 -0.203***
(0.145) (0.170) (0.251) (0.245) (0.223) (0.061)
                                        Other ethnicity -0.126** -0.119*** -0.112*** 0.248** -0.021 -0.058 0.004
(0.043) (0.019) (0.027) (0.076) (0.066) (0.040) (0.056)
Respondent living in urban area 0.066** 0.040 0.049* -0.015 -0.001 0.007 0.028
(0.032) (0.025) (0.028) (0.038) (0.031) (0.027) (0.030)
Province (Nairobi base group)
                                        Central -0.191*** -0.044 -0.142*** -0.009 0.215* 0.185** 0.106
(0.048) (0.061) (0.035) (0.125) (0.122) (0.094) (0.130)
                                        Coast -0.034 -0.018 -0.102** 0.089 0.090 0.125 -0.080
(0.055) (0.044) (0.046) (0.077) (0.108) (0.079) (0.090)
                                        Eastern -0.115* -0.067 -0.160** -0.035 0.253** 0.168* 0.165*
(0.062) (0.052) (0.051) (0.119) (0.090) (0.092) (0.099)
                                        Nyanza 0.033 -0.041 -0.105** 0.130 0.204* 0.222** 0.161
(0.078) (0.051) (0.052) (0.117) (0.108) (0.097) (0.109)
                                        Rift Valley 0.070 0.119** -0.001 0.018 0.180* 0.163** 0.097
(0.059) (0.053) (0.064) (0.072) (0.099) (0.065) (0.088)
                                        Western -0.102 0.127 0.031 0.006 0.432*** 0.427*** 0.274**
(0.074) (0.091) (0.078) (0.116) (0.079) (0.106) (0.094)
                                        North Eastern -0.133 -0.145*** -0.088 -0.023 -0.084 0.160
(0.090) (0.033) (0.246) (0.226) (0.119) (0.116)
Ethnic fragmentation at district level in 2007 0.090 -0.115 -0.016 0.090
(0.078) (0.074) (0.080) (0.108)
Respondent was a victim in outbreak of electoral 
violence 0.048 0.068* -0.022 0.049
(0.037) (0.037) (0.026) (0.037)
Pseudo R-squared 0.126 0.131 0.129 0.070 0.047 0.060 0.045
Observations 1210 982 1210 1210 1210 1210 1210  
Note: Coefficients  as marginal effects. dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
Significance Level, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors, clustered at constituency 
level, are shown  in parentheses.  